In contrast to the current discussion on Capacity Development (CD) which is mostly made from donors' aid-effectiveness point of view, this paper attempts to explore what foreign donors can learn about CD by tracing the endogenous and long-running CD process from insiders' perspectives. As a case study, an urban redevelopment project called MIB of the Medellin City of Colombia is examined. After clarifying the initial context of urban poverty in Colombia, the paper traces the six phases of the MIB project: institutional preparation and awareness enhancement, conception of the inclusive-urbanism idea, planning of the MIB, construction/reconstruction of the residences, resettlement of residents, and the scaling-up. Then the paper makes in-depth analysis of the whole process, focusing on five key CD factors identified by Hosono et al (2011) : stakeholder ownership, mutual learning, specific drivers, scaling up, and roles of external actors. From the analysis, the paper draws four major lessons on CD research and practice in the future. First, we need to change our time frame by which we look at the CD process. The MIB experience shows that the process can be by far longer than what has been assumed to be by donors and researchers. Second, the current project-centered periodization of development assistance and the overwhelming focus on the project period should be reconsidered. In the MIB, the project implementation phase took only five years among the total process of 30 years. Third, the MIB case shows that documentation of previous projects and seminars which occur in the pre-project phase under donors' auspices can greatly help local specialists conceive new ideas. Fourth, the post-project phase also merits a greater attention to identify constraints to sustainability and replicability of the project concerned and to explore what external actors can do to overcome the constraints. The paper concludes by pointing out the necessity of accumulating the similar kind of case studies on the CD process made from insiders' perspectives.
Introduction
The concepts of Capacity Development (CD) have emerged as a central issue in recent debates on development. CD indicates a process by which people, organizations, and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, and maintain their capacity over time to manage their own affairs successfully (OECD-DAC 2006) . Originated chiefly from the self-reflections by the donor community on why aids have not worked as expected, the CD concept has, overall, played an important role in deepening the understanding on how development actually takes place and how donors should behave in their effort to harness it. A broadly shared lesson from discussions on CD is that the capacity is by definition endogenous and consequently donors should catalyze but not try leading the development processes of recipient countries 1 . The main focus of CD discussion has now shifted to the operationalization of the CD concept including the measurement of the capacity 2 .
In this author's view, however, the current CD literatures have been only half successful in making a deep analysis of the endogenous CD process, for the following reasons. First, they examine CD mainly in the context of foreign aids, which would lead to underestimation of endogenous efforts and processes. For itself. External assistance did play a role, but only in the sense that memories and records of external assistances offered in the past served as "savings" for contemporary planners and practitioners 6 . Since the MIB has been only indirectly supported by external aid providers, we can expectedly trace the endogenous process in a clear and straightforward way. It may thus contribute to clarifying the kind of roles to be played by external actors in the future CD process.
Furthermore, the MIB has been featured in domestic and foreign mass media and in foregoing academic literature on urban planning as an outstandingly successful case of inclusive redevelopment of urban slums 7 .However, it has been analyzed neither from a long-run perspective covering several decades nor in the context of CD. The purpose of this paper is exactly to analyze the MIB as a CD fostering endeavor stretching over a long period of time.
An open-ended interviewing with the stakeholders was the principal research method in this paper. It was conducted in August -October 2010 as well as in February, May and July 2011 8 . Maximum efforts have been made to triangulate the information collected by interviews. However, since written materials are scarce, the author must acknowledge the possibility of information bias. This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 will introduce the outline of the MIB and then describe its six consecutive phases. Section 2 is dedicated to the analysis of the CD process focusing on the five factors mentioned in Hosono et al. (2010) . Finally, concluding remarks follow to share implications for future research and practice on CD.
1. Tracing the MIB process: facts, initial context and the process at each phase The process in which the idea of urban redevelopment in Medellin was fermented, planned and implemented can be chronologically divided into six phases. Phase 1 started in the 1980's, when relevant institutional transformations happened and the awareness of urban problems spread. Phase 2 was between 2000 and 2004, when the idea of MIB was first conceived. The actual planning of MIB for Juan Bobo proceeded in Phase 3 (2004 Phase 3 ( -2006 . In the following Phase 4 (2006) (2007) (2008) , construction works were implemented and, in Phase 5 (2008 Phase 5 ( -2009 , people resettled themselves in the new or renovated residences. Phase 6 is the post-project period in which similar projects have been implemented in other places and the Juan Bobo project site is frequently visited by domestic and international observers and practitioners. To these six MIB phases, we can add a pre-MIB period (1950s-1970s) in which the initial context of urbanization and poverty was formed in Colombia in general and in Medellin in particular but the awareness of the problems was not yet externalized.
1-1. Overview of the MIB in "Juan Bobo" 9 MIB was designed, coordinated, and implemented by EDU (Empresa de Dessarollo Urbano) 10 between 2004 and 2008 in Comuna #2 in the Northeastern zone of Medellin. The area is called Juan Bobo (See Figure 1) . The project targeted the dwellings which had settled along the banks of Juan Bobo stream, with a population of 1,353 (300 families) and the land of 1.75 hectares. MIB is a part of the PMIB (Integral Slum Improvement Program) (PMIB), a city program which attempted at integral slum redevelopment between 2004 and 2007 . The project goals were 1) applying the efficient and flexible planning procedure based on technical criteria adjusted for each micro-territory, 2) fostering community consensus and participation in generating secure co-living conditions, 3) improving the whole neighborhood by securing proper financial resources, 4) improving and legalizing residences on the basis of an analysis of the demographic dynamics, and 5) recovering degenerated land and environment to help the on-site resettlement. The total budget was close to US $4 million (Alcaldia de Medellin 2011). There were three project components; 1) physical components (construction or improvement of houses, public space creation, infrastructure development, 2) social components (community organization and participation, workshops, 6 CD may happen even in the environment in which foreign involvement is quite limited. There are works done on cases with no donor involvement such as Saxby (2004), but they are exceptions. 7 The project has been featured at national and international news (a typical title line is "from the city of gang, drug, and violence to the city of hope"), as well as in a UN document (UN-Habitat 2011), and internationally awarded in 2008 and 2009, which web sites are; http://dubai-award.dm.gov.ae/web/page_479.aspx http://currystonedesignprize.com/recipients/2009/transformative_public_works. Also refer to Alcaldia de Medellin 2011 , Blanco& Kobayashi 2009 , Cañón-Rubiano 2010 Interviews (semi structured or focus group) were designed by the author and conducted either by local consultants, Prof. Akio Hosono, or the author herself through direct manners or on-line. Interviewees include a variety of stakeholders involved in the MIB process such as EDU, the municipal government, NGOs, community leaders, and the beneficiary population. 9 MIB is also known as HCERP (Housing Consolidation and Environmental Recovery Program) or Heart felt Houses, and implemented as a mini-project under PMIB (Programa Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios). Jun Bobo means Silly John, which is a ravine in the Comuna 2 (Santa Cruz) in the North East Zone of the City of Medellin. The area is now newly named "Nuevo Sol de Oriente (New Sun of East)." The discussion in this sub-section is based on Rivas 2011 and http://dubai-award.dm.gov.ae/web/WinnersDetails.aspx?s=36&c=49 if not designated otherwise. 10 Empresa de Dessarollo Urbano (Urban Development Enterprise) trainings), and 3) institutional coordination (NGOs, construction companies, and universities involved) . No household was gentrified because of the project and every household was either relocated to new residence or returned to the renovated residence. The details of the project are presented in Appendix I.
Although direct cause-effect relations cannot be proven, we have observed in the (Hataya 2002) . The rural-urban migration to the Medellin City started in the early 1900's, but quickened after La Violencia. The city's population which had been 120,044 in 1928 almost tripled by 1951. Almost 600,000 people further migrated to the city during the 1960's, and its population reached 2.2 million during the 1980's (Alcaldia de Medellin 1996).
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The city started losing its industrial advantage from the late 1960's, which resulted in the downgrading of employment and the growth of the informal sector in and around the city. This socio-economic deterioration incubated "alternative" forces such as the Medellin drug cartel 12 , paramilitary 13 and guerrilla groups 14 and multiple other criminal organizations during the 1970's and 1980's (Betancur 2007) . In the context of the urban conflict, illegal recruitment became a covert form of human trafficking controlled by armed groups, leading recruited youths to undertake high-risk activities for exploitative purposes. The northeastern parts of the city, which are called Comuna #1 and #2, thus became the poorest and isolated areas from the rest of the city, stigmatized for being one of the most dangerous areas full of drug trafficking and gang activities. Environmental and safety problems (such as landslides in the rainy season), contamination of the main streams, and continuous expansion of overpopulated squats were equally troublesome (Blanco 2011:47) .
People started to immigrate to Comuna #2 (which includes Juan Bobo, the MIB implementation site) in the 70's and construct shacks with woods and trash materials. The population became very dense in the 80's, which forced people to construct houses on the stream bank of Juan Bobo, without proper infrastructure such as electricity and safe water. 80% of the houses had structural and functional deficiencies; one-third were located in the riverbed restricted areas. Lack of legal tenure also affected the supply of basic services; 50% of the water supply and 35% of power supply were obtained illegally (Rivas 2011: 43) . There have been very few community organizations and volunteer activities in the Comuna #2 and little trust in the government due to so many unfulfilled pre-election promises (Rivas; 2011:47) .
Regarding security, the homicide rate of the city reached 381 per 100,000 residents in 1991, which was the highest in the world (Perez 2011 92) . The security and poverty problems were long recognized by the city government, especially from the late 1980's although financial conditions did not allow the mayors to launch an integral and continuous slum redevelopment project (Rivas 2011) . 1970 . 12 The Medellin Cartel was an organized network of "drug suppliers and smugglers" originating in the city of Medellin, Colombia, which was run internationally. By 1993, the Colombian government, helped by the US, had successfully dismantled the cartel by imprisoning or hunting and gunning down its members. 13 Paramilitaries in Colombia refer to the origins and activities of right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia during the 20th century, considered to be most responsible for human rights violations in Colombia. 14 Such as FARC(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN(National Liberation Army). In the 1990's, there were a series of national legal transformations concerning urban planning. In 1991, Constitution was amended to enhance autonomy of local governments in administration, planning and promotion of economic and social development (Gonzalez et al 2009) . After this event, in the field of urban planning, the Law #3 (Housing System) was enacted in 1991 to provide housing subsidies. In 1993, the Law #99 was adopted to stipulate environmental obligations. The Law #152 (Development Plan) was issued in 1994 and the Law #388 (Territorial Orders) was enacted in 1997, emphasizing inclusive cities, citizen participation, ecological consideration, and equal distribution of benefits and costs (Rivas 2011) .
After the issuance of these national laws, City Development Plan (1996), POMCA (Plan de Manejo y Ordenamiento de una Cuenca: (Integral Micro catchment area Plan) 17 (1999) and POT 18 (Plan Ordenamiento Territorial: (Territory Ordering Plan)) (1999, revised in 2006) and PP (Plan Partial (Partial Plan))s 19 were drafted by DAPM 20 of the Medellin city government, and some of its staff were trained in the methodologies and application of territorial ordering 21 (ibid). After the POT was adopted in 1999, the city government started to consider constructing a public transport system which would also benefit slum communities. The city administration included a construction plan of MetroPlus (Rivas 2011 ) which was later constructed as MetroCable in 2002, dramatically improving slum residents' mobility.
During the same decade of 1990's, PRIMED (Programa de Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios Subnormales) 22 (1992-2002) , a large slum infrastructure development and housing improvement program, was implemented in Medellin. The project was technically and financially supported by KFW, UNDP and the National Government. It was implemented in the 3 zones (15 comunas) of the city, spending US $2,940 per household (Betancur 2007) . In addition to financial and technical assistance, the donors contributed to the documentation of experiences including feasibility studies. At the community level, CODEVI (Corporación de Desarrollo, Educación y Vivienda), a well-known NGO for popular housing, worked in Comuna #1 and #2.
As for citizens' awareness in general, the issue of poverty and violence became a shared social concern in the 1990's, partly because of mass-media reports. According to Rivas (2011) , local films such as "No Future (1990)" and "The Rose Seller (1998)" described the life and its subcultures in the comunas. Also, a television program called "Arriba mi Barrio" (currently called "Camino al Barrio") began in 1991, which has been on the air for 20 years until today. Community leaders themselves felt that the situation was problematic, but could not organize themselves, get their voices heard and tackle the problem, since they were caught up in the daily calamities and violence happening in front of them.
Finally, in 2002, the area became a target of Operacion Orion, anti-drug military intervention, organized by the national government with strong initiative of the president Uribe, who was once mayor of the Medellin City. The homicide rate nearly halved after this intervention.
1-4. Conception of the MIB idea in 2000-2004 (Phase 2)
Ideas leading to MIB were fermented at the Archquitecture and Urbanism Laboratory (LAUR:( Laboratorio de Arquitectura y Urbanismo (Arquitecture and Urbanism Laboratory))) 23 of the Pontificia Bolivariana University (UPB: Pontificia Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana (University of Bolivariana Pontificia)) 24 although the notions and practices of inclusive urban development had been long discussed and accumulated at CEHAP-PEVAL as mentioned in Sub-section 2-2.
LAUR is an investigation unit founded within UPB in the early 2000's, and has been involved in urban redevelopment projects of the Medellin city and surrounding cities as well as in the Urban Legalization and http://www.agora.unalmed.edu.co/principal/canal1/escuela.htm. The program has been renamed a couple of time from its foundation. 16 Regularization of Belén Rincón project in the Antioquia Department (Rivas 2011) . Their works on zoning, public space, urban renovation, housing, and integral improvement drew broad attention. LAUR was founded under the influence of international discourses on urban planning. From the 1990's, there has been emerging international discourses in urban/spatial planning to create sustainable and inclusive cities, where four principles of social urbanism were emphasized: citizen participation, consultation with experts, fair representation, and the appeal to act as advocates for collective decision-making and for the improvement of the affected community (UNECE 2008: ix) .
In the early 2000's, there were several encounters among key persons at LAUR. They shared common concepts and experiences of inclusive city development, especially in low-income areas. They are people who later got involved in EDU and MIB. Alejandro Echeverri, the first general director of EDU, had finished his doctoral degree in Spain and joined LAUR. He had strong interest in redevelopment of hillside slum communities, which was the main theme of his dissertation (Interviews with Alejandro Echeberri: 24 th of June 2011 and 10 th of February 2012). He took initiatives to install a laboratory in the northern part of the city to conduct field studies and held the first series of workshops and discussions on situations of urban slums and alternative solutions. Juliana Portillo, who would later become the coordinator of the MIB at EDU, had written her dissertation about the urban slum redevelopment project in Medellin (Interviews with Juliana Portillo: 24 th of June 2011 and 10 th of February 2012), sharing interest with Echeverri.
The period between 2000 and 2004 overlapped with the period in which Sergio Fajardo, the mayor who would decide to implement MIB, was preparing for the mayoral election. He originated from Medellin and as a journalist, had strong awareness of the issue of poverty and violence in the slum communities. Fajardo heard about LAUR from a faculty of the Architecture Department of the UPB, and one day stopped by to talk to Echeverri and ask him to help draft a city development plan (Interviews with Alejandro Echeverri: 24 th of June 2011).
In 2002, a public gondola-lift transport system called Metro-cable K line was inaugurated in Comuna #1 and #2, providing a 7-minutes service connecting hillside neighborhoods of Northeastern Medellin with the Medellin metro system, benefitting approximately 170,000 residents (Cañón-Rubiano, 2010) . This event happened to feature Comuna #1 and 2 as the areas whose living conditions were the lowest in the city and needed public interventions for improvement ( Figure 5) . Thus, the blueprint of MIB came to be included in the draft of the city development plan. Echeberri assigned some of his colleagues to the job of designing the MIB project. One of them was Carlos Montoya, who became the Director of Housing and Habitat of EDU and supervised the project from the planning to the end. He had been working for several major slum redevelopment projects in Medellin (ibid). He received education at CEHAP-PEVAL of the National University in Medellin (see 2-2). After graduating from the university, he participated in 1983-1987 in the rehabilitation project of the Moravia open garbage dump site where he experienced inter-institutional coordination to relocate 173 houses constructed along the steep riverside. Through direct negotiations with the residents, Montoya, with technical support of a sociologist, Montoya introduced a Certificate for Mutual Assistance by which people were given land ownership in exchange with their cooperation to help construct their own houses and community. 27 Montoya recalled that he learnt to implement projects in flexible ways depending on actual situations instead of relying on pre-fixing plans. He also noticed that new settlers intruded in the rehabilitated areas and informally constructed shacks again. In 1990, he participated in a KfW-financed international seminar on integrated slum redevelopment in Quito, Ecuador and exchanged his experiences with other specialists. The discussion at the seminar was published as a manual available for managers of similar projects. Subsequently, he participated in the PRIMED project (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , which also included housing improvements and relocations with community participation. PRIMED was a large project whose implementation followed a rather fixed, pre-planned schedule. Through those experiences, Montoya understood that there are two different modes for implementing urban redevelopment projects: process-oriented and plan-oriented. He also learnt how to conduct interdisciplinary and inter-institutional urban projects. His cooperation with NPOs further taught him how to facilitate community participation and educate its residents (Interviews with Carlos Montoya: 24 th of June 2011 and 10 th of February 2012).
Under Montoya's supervision, the MIB project was gradually shaped. First, international policy documents regarding inclusive cities were reviewed and four priorities were identified: local actions, housing for all, risk prevention, and minority inclusion. Second, in cooperation with the city government, the team also made a census of 6000 houses in the North Eastern part of the city. Finally, Juan Bobo was selected for the project site.
Afterward, project components (physical, social, inter-institutional) were determined and an interdisciplinary team was formed 28 , both modeled on Montoya's Moravia and PRIMED experiences (ibid). In selecting the team members, Montoya and Portillo identified, during the field research in the Comuna #1, candidates who had capacities to work for popular housing in slum communities. The size of the team was flexible and changed throughout the project, some being in-and-out, and the others worked intensively on particular phases of the project. The team members' TORs have been gradually fixed through the process of social learning, depending on each member's strength (Interviews with Juliana Portillo: 10 th of February 2012).
Rapport building and Social learning Under Portillo's coordination and Montoya's supervision, team members visited households daily, especially in the first two months. They started from walking and looking around in the community, then having casual conversations with the residents, measuring roads and taking soil samples, telling the residents that they would come back later (Focus Group Discussions with residents:24 th of June, 2011, 10 th of February 2012). Montoya wanted his team to have enough time of social learning to know the community through "field work", as well as to identify who would become active participants in the project. After getting to know the area, the MIB team members conducted interviews with residents of each household, to understand the number of residents in each household, their background and livelihood, whether they had property rights or have paid taxes and utility fees and so on, as well as making a rough sketch of each house (ibid). Subsequently, they started taking a formal census of each household to double-check the information taken from the interviews, to gain a more detailed understanding of the residents' living conditions (ibid).
context to promote contracting out public services. After three years, EDU started dealing with real estate and urban development projects including public space development. In 2002, EDU was reorganized and now is working as a legal body of the city with administrative and financial autonomy. 27 Bonos de Ayuda Mutua, developed by the Sociologist Luis Fernando Londoño Nicols (Rivas 2011) . A virtual wage was calculated based on the national minimum salaries. The team members have thus tried to build rapport and trusting relationships with the residents as they were aware that without this they could not realize the MIB project. It is noteworthy that the residents still remember the first names of the MIB team members. They witnessed the team first coming to look, talk, and listen before starting negotiation about relocation (Interviews with residents:24 th of June, 2011). Montoya expressed "negotiation and rapport, not imposition, was the most fundamental "tool" of the project so that people would have ownership". (Interview with Carlos Montoya: 24th of June, 2011). Sociologist Javier Jaramillo, who currently runs MIB projects in several locations in the Metropolitan areas of Medellin, also pointed out that micro-politics, favor-ism and information manipulation were usual practices in slum communities, but now it is important to gain people's trust through equal-footing dialogues (Interview with Javier Jarallimo: 25 th of June, 2011). "It must have been an epoch-making event for people to be listened to, spoken with and visited so frequently since they kept feeling abandoned by the rest of the city for a long period", a community leader said (Interview with Mr. Elkin Zapata: 14 th of February, 2011).
Making agreements with the residents Subsequently, the team invited the residents to meetings to exchange opinions and reach a consensus on the project, including the geographical limitations and timelines (Interviews with Juliana Portillo: 24 th of June 2011, 10 th of February 2012). These meetings were often organized at night time on the weekends and MIB staff invited all the residents. The staff even visited households whenever they were asked for further explanation and discussions (ibid). During the meetings, the team members suggested the best options from their analysis and asked people to show "yellow cards" when they thought they were off-track (Interview with Carlos Montoya: 24th of June 2011, 10 th of February 2012). The members also asked the residents to express how they wanted to change the community in details; how the roads, houses and public spaces should look compared with what they actually had (ibid.). The team sometimes made rough sketches in front of the residents to visualize their images. The team also visualized how the new community would look like and listened to residents' views (See Figure 2) . At this time, a housing committee was formed to deal with all the paperwork to get public subsidies and apply for housing titles (Rivas 2011.) Finally, an assembly was held to geographically define the project area. Agreements were also made on the following points: (1) nobody would be forced to leave and all would be resettled in Juan Bobo, (2) EDU would not provide the same treatment to new squatters, and (3) There would be no more DIY house construction or improvement. The interviewed residents testified that those pacts actually worked as a strong guarantee that they could certainly come back to the community (Rivas 2011) . 
Getting into details
After the assembly, the MIB team further elaborated the plan and explained to the residents that 120 houses (colored yellow, orange, and brown in Figure 7 ) that needed more than 60% replacement and the houses constructed on the riverside would be completely rebuilt while 140 houses (colored green) that needed less than 40% replacement would be improved instead of rebuilt. The team also made agreements with the residents with regard to construction of public spaces such as parks, gully redevelopment, public services and the bridge to connect the community (Rivas 2011) . The staff used visual images so that the residents could easily imagine how the community would be transformed (ibid). After the residents accepted the project plan, the team asked the residents to organize three more committees (risk prevention, environment, and children). It also helped them apply for subsidies (national, regional, and city, covering approximately 70% of the construction costs) based on the Law #3 (ibid). The MIB team and the residents, at this point, also introduced publicity boards to inform the progress of the project and share concerns and suggestions. The boards are still used today (ibid).
At this phase, EDU contracted a NGO named CODEVI, to design each house for housing improvement. As each household had various needs and preferences, designing must be done quite differently. Temporary relocation commenced, with an average duration of approximately one year (Rivas 2011) . Finally, the detailed designs of each house and new buildings as well as public spaces were completed and eight construction companies were selected for the new construction. Apart from the contractors, around ten organizations participated in providing financial or technical support 29 .
Figure7: variations of house construction materials and houses for replacement/improvement
Source: EDU (Left: brown: hut with temporary resource, Orange: hut with bricks, Beige: brick houses) (Right: yellow, orange, and brown for replacement, green for house improvement)
1-6. Construction in 2006-2008 (Phase 4)
After the construction started, the residents offered their working hours equivalent to 10% of the subsidies in the form of offering labor for construction, cleaning the site and protecting the contractors from any obstruction (Interviews with Juliana Portillo: 10 th of February 2012). At this moment, the MIB team mediated the process to decide which household took which apartment compound (ibid). Although the residents agreed to disabled people or the elderly taking the ground floor, the rest of households could not easily reach consensus and but finally agreed to use lottery arbitrated by the team (Interviews with Juliana Portillo: 24 th of June 2011, 10 th of February 2012).
The MIB team installed a construction information center so that people could stop by and make any inquiry as well as organize cultural activities such as plays, workshops on social environment and kitchen gardens, cleaning and environmental campaigns, as well as meetings to elaborate a manual of co-living to share values and rules in the new community after the construction (Rivas 2011) . According to interviews with the residents, during this period, the residents sometimes felt worried especially when the construction work fell behind schedule. But in such occasions, they would visit the construction sites, and understood that their houses were being renovated, and convinced themselves that they would get a place to live and not be gentrified (ibid).
1-7. Resettlement in 2008-2009 (Phase 5)
After the construction was finished, the residents started coming back to the community. Most of their houses were not only renovated but dramatically improved, with more floors, yards and balconies, and public spaces (Focus Group Discussions with residents on 24 th of June 2011). In February 2008, the newly elected mayor Alonso Salazar hosted an inauguration ceremony for the new apartments 30 . But there was a series of follow-up activities after the ceremony to support relocation. The EDU, especially the social group composed of sociologists and social workers, worked as facilitator who supported the people to feel resettled, especially for those who moved into the apartments. The team mediated the process of rule setting and the manual elaboration, which was distributed to each household (Rivas 2011) . Simultaneously, the team facilitated the process of formalization of property rights of each apartment compounds (ibid). The residents renamed the renewed community "Nuevo Sol de Oriente (New Sun of the East)" and gave a specific name to each new building (Interviews with social worker Marco Gamboa and Mary Bao: 24 th of June 2011). They also decided to recognize the people who showed strong leadership during the project process as the community leaders (ibid).
As for the outcome of the project, apart from the macro-level index improvement mentioned in Subsection 1-1, many impacts were felt or experienced by the residents. For instance, an Impact Assessment Survey on Socio-Spatial influences applied to more than 150 beneficiary families demonstrated a remarkable transformation in the community's trends of behavior in relation to the environment and their notion of security. The interviewed residents felt greater security in the area as the risks of floods, contamination and violence in general have radically diminished. They ranked pedestrian pathways, the bridge across the Juan Bobo stream and public stairs as the top three public infrastructures built by the project Regarding the Juan Bobo MIB, the following problems emerged in the focus group discussions conducted on 24 th of June, 2011. First, there were people whose houses were excluded from the MIB while their neighbors became beneficiaries. This generated tensions among residents 32 . Second, many residents feel that social ties with families and neighbors have been weakened. Third, there is an issue of property rights. Some families have received unofficial documents, not the title deeds, due to the long duration and complex paperwork. Fourth, as their houses are now registered, the residents needed to pay tax and utility fees even though their income has not changed or has even declined. Fifth, there is still a problem of bad smell coming from the small river running through the project area as upper-hill communities still do not have a sewage system and people are still dumping trash into it. It is to be seen how far the beneficiary population was empowered or has developed its capacities to maintain the renovated communities and buildings as well as to deal with remaining or emerging issues.
Beyond Juan Bobo, geographic scaling up of the project has been observed around Medellin. Five MIB projects have been either planed or implemented in Juan Bobo #2, La Herrera, Santo Domingo, La Cruz, and La Onda (Rivas 2011, see Figure8) . In the broader Medellin metropolitan areas, there have been seven MIB projects indicated in the map (ibid). However, methodologies used in the new sites were quite different from the ones used in Juan Bobo. Institutionally, the PMIB has been transferred from EDU to ISVIMED (Instituto de Vivienda y Hábitat). 33 The latter has a strong focus on construction of new houses and utilities 34 . Social 30 There was a pre-inauguration by the mayor Fajardo before his term of office finished. 31 "Urban Planning System and Land Management Instruments" (2010) (2011) (2012) organized by the National Planning Department. 32 The author could not find out possible micro-political reasons (e.f. self-exclusion or social exclusion among people) behind the decision of project area, which should be further examined. 33 Instituto de Vivienda y Hábitat components and public space creation, major innovations in the Juan Bobo project, are now less emphasized. In this section, the MIB process described in the preceding section will be analyzed in accordance with the five CD factors identified by Hosono et al (2010) : (1) stakeholder ownership, (2) specific drivers, (3) mutual learning, (4) pathways to scaling up, and (5) the role of external actors.
2-1 Stakeholder Ownership
Various organizations have been involved directly or indirectly as stakeholders during the whole MIB process: PEVAL-CEHAP, LAUR-UPB, EDU (including MIB team), the municipal government, CODEVI, JICA, KfW, UNDP, IHS, National Government, FOVIMED, AREA, EPM, VIVA, the Ministry of Environment, MAVDT, FONVIVIENDA, the beneficiary residents, and many others. Obviously, the MIB team of the Medellin City and Mayor Sergio Fajardo demonstrated strong ownership, but it is doubtful whether EDU (the organization to which the MIB team belongs), the municipal government as a whole, and the beneficiary population shared the same degree of ownership. The discrepancy in ownership probably affected the project process and its sustainability.
However, the success of the Juan Bobo project is due to a common interest in the creation of an inclusive city as a solution to urban poverty. All stakeholders, regardless of different degrees of their ownership, shared the belief in social urbanism, which helped difficult and complex coordination during the planning and implementation phases of the project.
2-2. Specific Drivers There were three major drivers which made advance the MIB process in Medellin: (1) initiatives and skills of specialists and political leaders, (2) enabling policies and plans, and (3) other environmental or coincidental factors.
As a specialist, Montoya's role as the supervisor of the project was extraordinary. Equally important was Mayor Fajardo's political leadership. It is the mayor who decided to implement MIB in the city and assigned LAUR staff to EDU, the MIB implementation body. In the EDU, Echeverri had helped draft a city plan, of which the MIB was born. Portillo coordinated the highly complicated MIB planning and implementation process in which various organizations and several budgetary sources were involved. At the community level, CODEVI, a well-known NGO for popular housing, played an important role as a contractor which designed each house in harmony with general improvement of the community. It took advantage of the close relations it had established with residents through their prior activities in the area. In short, vibrant political leaders and specialists, with prior networks among themselves and with the residents, played a crucial role as drivers of the MIB process.
The second specific driver is the enabling policy environment. Following the amendment of Constitution in 1991, four major laws related to housing and urban development --Law #3 (for housing system) , Law #99 (environmental considerations in land development), Law #152 (for development planning), and Law #388 (territorial orders) --were promulgated at the national level between 1991 and 1997 . In Medellin, City Development Plan (1996 , POMCA (1999) and POT (1999 POT ( , revised in 2006 and PPs were drafted. The City Development Plan helped justify the MIB while a part of its budget was filled by national, departmental and city subsidies granted under the Law #3. New institutions also influence public awareness. The POT was followed by the construction of MetroCable, which in turn featured dilapidated conditions of Comuna #1 and #2 and called for further public interventions.
Third, there were several contingent drivers which served as additional enabling environments. For instance, financial conditions of the Medellin City happened to be sound and enabled the city government to make a substantial financial contribution to the MIB program. This is important because the national and departmental subsidies for house construction, though substantial, was not enough to cover the expenses necessary for construction, the hiring of specialists at EDU, and related administrative works at the city government. The city has been known for its outstanding public finance performance from 2000 (Gonzalez 2009 ). Another contingent factor was the media coverage of urban poverty. It greatly contributed to raising public awareness on the issue. Additionally, the military intervention called Operacion Orion helped draw attention to the urban issues of the city. It also helped improve security situations of the area, facilitating the project implementation later.
2-3. Mutual Learning and Innovative Solutions
Various outputs resulting from mutual learning among stakeholders can be observed from Phase 2 (Conception Phase) to Phase 5 (Resettlement). It is noteworthy to point out that the MIB team played different roles in mutual learning at each stage. Their learning counterparts also shifted, but innovative solutions were found out at each stage to make the process moving forward.
At Phase 2 (Conception Phase), learning occurred among LAUR researchers and between the researchers and politicians/staffs of the city government. Especially at LAUR, from which MIB staffs would be recruited, there were a couple of innovative field experiments that contributed to crystalizing the idea of inclusive urban development. At this phase, the MIB staff-to-be served mainly as engineering specialists.
At the planning stage, communications between MIB staff and residents started. The MIB staff now functioned as social workers walking in the community to get basic information and building rapport with the residents. Subsequently, actual town designs were sketched and put into real plans through conversations between the staff and residents. At this point, consensus was reached with regard to the basic rules of project implementation.
When the actual construction commenced, the MIB team mainly played the role of coordinator. The members facilitated the residents to discuss how to administer the new town-to-be and offered training courses and workshops on environment-friendly manners of living and skill development for income generation. The project staff also coordinated activities of ten or so organizations (public agencies, private firms, NGOs).
At the resettlement phase, the MIB team members became facilitators, helping the residents to set rules to manage apartments and live in harmony.
2-4. Pathway to Scaling Up
Although attempts have been made to scale up the Juan Bobo project domestically and internationally, there are two constraints affecting sustainability of the project at the last phase (Phase 6). One is the sustainability of the Juan Bobo project itself. The other is the replicability of the PMIB model developed at Juan Bobo.
Before anything else, the sustainability of the Juan Bobo project requires that beneficiary residents demonstrate ownership and initiative to solve remaining problems. Among such issues are how to remedy the social tension created between benefitted residents and those outside of the project area, how to collectively manage apartment buildings, pay taxes and utility fees, and how to reduce water contamination and bad odors of the stream. The solution of these problems requires common efforts by the residents. They seem to lack enough capacity for such works and still need external facilitators to help them tackle the problems Regarding replicability of the MIB, contradictions or lack of coordination among institutions are observed as main constraints. First, it is unclear how the three city plans (development plan, micro-catchment plan, territory ordering plan) elaborated under the different laws are combined with one another. In the case of MIB, it was strongly connected with the city development plan, but was not necessarily in alignment with the other two plans, especially with the territory ordering plan. As the city development plan can radically change, depending on the policy of elected mayors, it would be desirable that the PMIB be closely integrated with the other two plans, as the latter is less politically driven.
The second issue is friction between the two distinct approaches to urban redevelopment taken by different organizations: the process-oriented or plan-oriented approaches. At Juan Bobo, EDU took the process-oriented and labor-intensive approach. This approach, however, was not succeeded by ISVIMED, when the PMIB was transferred from EDU to this organization. ISVIMED's work style is to construct new buildings on the basis of nationally determined goals and blueprints. As a result, social components, public space creations and residents' participation are less emphasized in the new MIBs. In the final analysis, the success of the social-urbanism approach at Juan Bobo largely depended on Montoya's expertise and leadership and the team members' dedications and pragmatic work styles. Continuous political will and pragmatic dedications will be the keys to insure replicability of the original MIB without diluting its social urbanism components such as paper-work assistances for subsidy application, beneficiaries' participation and organization, public space creation, capacity building workshops, and resettlement supports.
2-5. Roles of External Actors
As mentioned in the introductory section and reconfirmed in this paper, no international donors were directly involved in the Juan Bobo project. However, donors' assistances to similar projects implemented before the MIB functioned as catalysts for the project. For instance, the IHS helped a university program called CEHAP-PEVAL in which Arq. Montoya (the MIB team supervisor) obtained basic ideas on inclusive urban planning. At PEVAL-CEHAP, he had opportunities to participate in urban redevelopment projects such as Moravia and PRIMED, sponsored by KfW and UNDP. He further developed his networks and got knowledge through an international workshop in Quito sponsored by KfW. KfW further prepared written documents on the workshop which later served to inspire Colombian specialist on inclusive urban planning. JICA in its part offered a series of training courses on inclusive urban planning and territory ordering. All these assistances, with or without intentions, inspired and nurtured the basic ideas of MIB.
As mentioned in the previous Subsection, efficient replication of the Juan Bobo MIB needs institutional and planning coordination as well as harmonization between process-oriented and plan-oriented approaches. Here, external actors may be able to serve again as catalysts of scaling up by organizing seminars or training courses and by financing new projects.
3. Concluding Remarks: Implications for further research and discussion on CD The five CD factors (stakeholder ownership, mutual learning, specific drivers, scaling up, and roles of external actors) presented by Hosono et al. (2010) can indeed be identified in the MID case. Stakeholder ownership was strongly observed especially in Phase 1. In various phases, mutual learning occurred between the residents and the MIB team members and among MIB team members themselves, and among various organizations being involved in the project, resulting in project implementation with strong social components. Several specific drivers (driving forces) were also identified while external actors indirectly supported the MIB elaboration process. As a result, the MIB at Juan Bobo became one of the most successful urban redevelopment projects based on social urbanism in the world. The project has also been scaled up to a certain extent although many challenges remain for the expansion of the inclusive approach.
From the analysis above, we can draw three main lessons on CD. First, we need to change our time frame by which we look at the CD process. The MIB experience shows that the process can be by far longer than what has been assumed to be by donors and researchers. Twenty-five years passed between Phase 1 in which institutional preparation was made and public awareness was enhanced and Phase 3 in which actual project planning started. In addition to these preparatory years, five more years were necessary to implement construction works and make residents resettled. Although it is not necessary for donors/external actors to accompany the recipient country in the whole process, such historical timeframe and depth of historical context should be taken into account when they design development cooperation projects/programs with CD components.
Second, related to the first point, the current periodization of development assistance into three phases --before (where awareness is raised and shared), during (project period), and after (where scaling up hopefully occurs) -and the overwhelming focus on the project period should be reconsidered. In the MIB, the project implementation (construction and resettlement) phase took only five years among the total process of 30 years. An especially greater attention needs to be directed to the pre-project phases of awareness building and project conception as the direction and deepness of endogenous CD is largely formed during these phases. By focusing on the pre-project phases, we will be able to look into the factors which have been scarcely treated in the CD literature. For instance, the initial conception was greatly precipitated by the course of events in which institutional reforms and the rising of awareness on urban poverty synchronically happened.
Third, the importance of the pre-project phases was also shown by the documentation of previous projects and seminars which would later come to greatly help specialists conceive new ideas. In the MIB case, donors' role was crucial in this respect. By bringing external ideas and experiences, external actors can play important and sometimes unintended roles of helping incubate innovative ideas partially based on external ideas but adjusted to the local conditions. Fourth, the post-project phase also merits a greater attention. Major constraints are observed in the issue of sustainability and replicability. The experiences at Juan Bobo demonstrated that the project did not end at the completion of construction works. To connect the new housing opportunities with the improvement of individual and community life, the real aim of the project, the beneficiary population needed to be "empowered" to deal with the remaining problems. On the other hand, to enhance the chance of replicability, close coordination among relevant institutions and policies as well as among distinct development approaches is crucial. Here again, external actors may be able to contribute by serving as coordinators and by providing information on new ideational trends of the world.
This paper focused on a single CD case and extracted several lessons on future research and practice of CD as well as the role of external actors. Tracing the whole process of conception, planning, implementation, and scaling up, it clarified that CD is a long-term endogenous process that proceeds through interactions among local stakeholders. External actors played an indirect but important role as catalyst of the change. However, since the CD process is still little known, similar in-depth studies need to be accumulated on many other cases. In such studies, not only the project phase but also pre-project and post-project phases should be closely examined. Furthermore, the cases with various degrees of donor participation should be compared to look into the role of external actors. Such research will be a time-consuming attempt but it will reward everybody involved in the development assistance by helping enhance our understanding of CD in practice. 
